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Abstract 
This study compared the moral reasoning abilities of juvenile sex and non-sex 
offenders using a novel methodology that explored their responses to moral questions in a 
variety of offending contexts. Seven sexual and nine nonsexual adolescent male offenders 
from a maximum security detention facility in New South Wales, Australia, were presented 
with a variety of hypothetical offending situations involving sexual and non sexual offences 
and asked to discuss these. It was hypothesised that the quality of moral reasoning employed 
by offenders would be impaired in those offending contexts in which they had prior 
experience. Responses were assessed using a modified version of the Moral Judgment 
Interview Standard Issue Scoring Manual (MJI; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Assigned levels of 
moral reasoning ability were verified independently by two expert raters. Responses by 
sexual offenders in sexual offending contexts and by nonsexual offenders in nonsexual 
offending contexts were dominated by preconventional reasoning. Both groups employed a 
greater use of conventional reasoning in non-congruent offending contexts.  
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Moral development takes place within a social context. It is promoted by social 
experiences that provide the opportunity for perspective taking and that produce cognitive 
conflict (Speicher, 1992). Social interaction with parents, family, and peers plays an 
important role. Once formed, moral standards serve as guides or deterrents for action 
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). According to cognitive developmental 
perspectives, moral development evolves through a regular sequence of stages, whereby the 
overall organization or structure of thought guides the type of moral reasoning employed at 
each stage. Emphasis is placed on the qualitative form of moral reasoning and on 
developmental changes in that reasoning (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Moral development is 
analogous to cognitive development in that each new stage represents a qualitative 
reorganisation of the individual’s approach towards moral reasoning, with each new 
reorganisation integrating the insights achieved at prior stages within a broader cognitive-
developmental perspective (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Kohlberg (1958; 1978) articulates a 
six-stage cognitive-developmental model of moral reasoning, which he groups into three 
levels. Preconventional moral reasoning (Stages 1 and 2) is characterised by egocentricity 
and self-interest (concrete individual perspective). Individuals reasoning at this level are 
essentially unaware of socially shared moral norms and expectations. Conventional moral 
reasoning (Stages 3 and 4) is characterised by social awareness and social conformity 
(member of society perspective). At this level, individual need is subordinated to the needs of 
socially shared relationships and the wider society. At the postconventional level (Stages 5 
and 6) moral reasoning is characterised by principled thinking. Universal principles that 
promote individual autonomy and uphold human rights are applied to moral conflicts, even 
when these run counter to social norms and values (prior to society perspective). Children 
under the age of nine years typically reason at the preconventional level and adolescents and 
adults typically reason at the conventional level. A minority of the adult population reasons at 
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the postconventional level, but this rarely occurs before the ages of 20-25 years. Adolescent 
and adult offenders typically reason at the preconventional level (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). 
Moral Reasoning and Offending Behaviour  
Researchers have employed a variety of research designs to quantify and describe 
moral reasoning ability in offending populations. Most have involved between group 
comparisons with non-offending control groups that have been matched on one or more of a 
number of demographic variables. In nearly all cases, participants are presented with 
hypothetical dilemmas, and asked to articulate a suitable response. Both production (i.e., the 
participant is required to articulate an open ended response to a moral dilemma) and 
recognition (i.e., the participant is required to articulate a response based on a fixed choice 
response format) instruments have been used. The Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987) and Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger, 
& Fuller, 1992) are two of the more commonly used production based instruments, and the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1979, 1993) is one of the more commonly used recognition 
based instruments. Each is based on Kohlberg’s six-stage theory of moral development, and 
each reflects a strong cognitive-developmental perspective. This research demonstrates that 
offenders are arrested in their moral development and reason at lower levels than non-
offenders (Bartek, Krebs, & Taylor, 1993; Chandler & Moran, 1990; Lee & Prentice, 1988; 
Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; Trevethan &Walker, 1989). A hypothesis arising from these 
findings is that offending behaviour can be reduced by enhancing the moral reasoning 
abilities of offenders. This hypothesis remains largely unsupported however (Armstrong, 
2003; Claypoole, Moody, & Peace, 2000). One possible reason for this is that offenders are 
not homogenous in terms of their offending behaviours. Offenders exhibit a variety of 
offender characteristics (e.g., antisocial, psychopathic, impulsive, hyperactive), commit a 
variety of offence types (e.g., homicide, assault, sexual assault, robbery), and are influenced 
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by different offending contexts (e.g., poverty, substance dependence, acculturation). Research 
in fact demonstrates that all not all offenders are equal in terms of their moral reasoning 
abilities, and that not all offenders employ levels of moral reasoning below that of their non-
offending counterparts. For example, Valliant, Gauthier, Pottier, and Kosmyna (2000) 
compared the moral reasoning abilities of sexual offenders (rapists, incest offenders, child 
molesters), general offenders, and non-offenders. Results demonstrated that the rapist and 
child molester groups employed higher levels of moral reasoning than the incest offender, 
general offender, and non-offender groups. Research also demonstrates that offenders are 
more likely to engage in lower levels of moral reasoning over real life, as opposed to 
hypothetical dilemmas (Trevethan & Walker, 1989), and over offence related, as opposed to 
offence non-related dilemmas (Palmer & Hollin, 1998). Others have suggested that the 
quality of moral reasoning employed by offenders will be impaired in those offending 
contexts in which they have had prior experience (Bartek et al., 1993).  
 The primary aim of the current study, therefore, was to compare the moral reasoning 
abilities of different offender types within different offending contexts. The moral reasoning 
abilities of sexual and nonsexual adolescent offenders were compared within a variety of 
offending contexts. It was hypothesised that the quality of moral reasoning employed by 
offenders would be impaired in those offending contexts in which they had prior experience, 
such that the moral reasoning abilities of sexual offenders would be impaired in sexual 
offending contexts, and the moral reasoning abilities of nonsexual offenders would be 
impaired in nonsexual offending contexts. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 16 incarcerated male offenders from a maximum security 
adolescent detention facility administered by the New South Wales Department of Juvenile 
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Justice. Participants ranged in age from 16-19 years (M =17.95 years, SD = 1.14 years). 
Seven participants had been convicted of, or were being held on remand for sexually based 
offences (n = 3 and 4 respectively: sexual offender group) and nine participants had been 
convicted of, or were being held on remand for serious nonsexual offences (n = 7 and 2 
respectively: nonsexual offender group). Eleven participants had prior convictions for 
property offences and five participants had prior convictions for person offences. No 
participants from the nonsexual offender group had prior convictions for sexually based 
offences. There were eight Australian/Caucasians, four Indigenous Australians, two from the 
Middle East, and one each from the Pacific Islands and Asia. All participants were fluent in 
English.  
Measures 
Interview schedule. The interview schedule was designed to examine the moral 
reasoning in serious and repeat young offenders. Participants were asked about the 
importance of obeying the law, and whether there was a difference between:  (a) stealing 
from a shop and stealing from a person; (b) stealing from an old person and stealing from a 
young person; (c) stealing from a poor person and stealing from a rich person; (d) assaulting 
a man and assaulting a woman; and (e) assault and sexual assault? Participants’ responses to 
these questions provided the primary data for the current study. 
Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) Standard Issue Scoring Manual. The Moral 
Judgment Interview Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) assesses and 
quantifies the developmental level of moral reasoning. It is a production-based measure of 
moral reasoning ability that yields rich qualitative responses that cannot be obtained with 
forced choice questionnaires, such as the DIT. The MJI provides a theory based assessment 
procedure that measures the quality of an individual’s moral reasoning on the developmental 
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sequence postulated by Kohlberg’s six stage theory of moral development, and offers a 
structured method of analysis that minimises subjectivity.  
Procedure 
Sample selection. Potential participants were screened for suitability via a 
departmental information database. Extreme case sampling was employed to identify serious 
and/or repeat offenders, and purposeful sampling was employed to identify sexual and 
nonsexual offenders. Detention centre clinical staff were presented with a list of possible 
participants for the study and asked to identify those most appropriate on the basis of the 
following exclusion criteria: (a) untreated psychosis; (b) substance withdrawal (excluding 
nicotine and cannabis); and (c) recent history of self-harming or suicidal behaviour. At total 
of 19 candidates were approached. All but one expressed interest in participating in the study.  
 Data collection. Interviews were conducted between August 2003 and January 2004 
in an office in the detention centre. Signed informed consent was obtained at the beginning of 
each interview. Interviews ranged in length between ninety minutes and three hours and were 
recorded on audiocassette. Data from one participant was lost through faulty recording and 
one participant discontinued the interview after 30 minutes, leaving a total of 16 completed 
interviews for data analysis.  Neutral probes were used to encourage participants to provide 
detailed responses where necessary (e.g., Can you tell me more about that? What do you 
think the difference is? How are they different?). Participants were debriefed at the 
conclusion of the interview and given the opportunity to ask questions. Interviews were later 
transcribed verbatim for data analysis. 
 Scoring. Identifying information was removed from the transcripts and scoring was 
conducted blindly with respect to offence type. Participants’ responses were scored 
independently by the first author and by a second researcher and scored according to the 
scoring criteria outlined in the Moral Judgment Interview Standard Issue Scoring Manual 
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(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Because the scoring criteria in this manual reflect particular 
moral dilemmas and moral issues, and because few of the questions used in this study were 
exactly represented in the manual, the scoring required modification of the usual procedure. 
The procedure employed by Trevethan and Walker (1989) was employed. Rather than 
focusing on particular critical indicators (that are dilemma specific) scoring relied on the 
stage structure definitions for each response. In order to be scorable, a reason had to be 
provided (either explicitly or implicitly) for the response given. If a reason was not provided 
after probing, the participant was assumed unable to provide a reasoned response to the 
question, and the response was scored “Stage 1”. Thirteen of the 96 responses (13.5%) were 
provided without a discernible reason and were scored as Stage 1 responses. For all other 
responses, scores were assigned for every reason that matched a stage structure definition 
anywhere in the manual, regardless of the dilemma. Inter rater reliability was measured as the 
number of corresponding scores out of a total of 96 responses, resulting in 81.3% agreement. 
Discrepant scores were subsequently resolved through discussion between the first and 
second authors.  
Results 
Qualitative Description of Participants’ Responses 
 Obeying the law. All but one participant indicated that it was important to obey the 
law. Typical responses included “it’s important to a certain extent”, “it’s important”, “it’s 
pretty important”, “it’s very important”, and “it’s really really important”. The dissenting 
participant assumed a more questioning stance by responding, “it depends what the law is”.  
Stealing from a shop/person. When asked if there was a difference between stealing 
from a shop and stealing from a person, participants were evenly divided in their responses. 
Eight participants answered in the affirmative and eight in the negative. Affirmative 
responses were grounded in a sense of “loss” or “consequence” to the victim, and all 
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indicated a preference for stealing from a shop. Typical affirmative responses included, 
“insurance covers for all those things in the shop”, “people have to struggle to get it back”, 
“you could steal a thousand dollars from a bank and they wouldn’t notice”, and “if it’s from a 
shop you know it’s just another chocolate bar on the rack”. Typical negative responses (i.e., 
indicating an opinion of no difference) included, “stealing is stealing”, and “it’s the same 
crime”, while one respondent replied, “I just think money brother, as long as it makes money 
I’ll get it”.  
 Stealing from the old/young. Most participants indicated that there was a difference 
between stealing from an old person and stealing from a young person. Only two answered in 
the negative. All affirmative responses revealed a negative attitude towards stealing from an 
old person, and were grounded in a sense of “vulnerability” and “respect”. Typical responses 
included, “an old lady, she can’t defend herself”, “ [old people] they’re defenceless…they 
can’t protect themselves”, “I don’t rort pensioners, old people, I rort young kids, the hard 
cunts”, “it could cause them to have a heart attack”, and “you respect ya elders bra, you don’t 
fuckin’ go robbin’ old people, they got no, like no chance of you know, like fightin’ you or 
anythink”. Negative responses were again based on the notion that “stealing is stealing”. 
 Stealing from the poor/rich. Participants were more evenly divided in their opinions 
when asked if there was a difference between stealing from a poor person and stealing from a 
rich person. Seven participants answered in the affirmative, seven in the negative, and two 
replied, “it depends”. All of the affirmative responses indicated a preference for stealing from 
the rich, and were grounded in a sense of “need” or “deservingness”. Typical responses 
included, “they’ve got lots of money”, “if their TV’s missing I’m sure they’re gonna be able 
to get another one”, “they pull money outta their arse”, “they go down the bank, they pull out 
money straight away, they don’t care”, “the rich person deserves to be rorted, he needs to be 
rorted”, and “’cause they think they’re so good and stuck up, their nose is always in the air”. 
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Ambivalent responses were also grounded in a sense of “deservingness” and included, “it 
depends if the rich person is like greedy you know” and “but what sort of rich person, like a 
fuckin’ bad rich person, good rich person?” Once again, negative responses were grounded in 
the notion that “stealing is stealing”. 
 Assault man/woman. Fourteen participants responded in the affirmative when asked if 
there was a difference between assaulting a man and assaulting a woman. Only one 
participant responded in the negative, while another took an ambivalent stance. All of the 
affirmative responses indicated a negative attitude towards the assault of women, and were 
generally grounded in a sense of “vulnerability” or “social convention”.  Typical responses 
included, “a man can take more than a woman”, “a woman’s more defenceless than a man”, 
“a man’s a man, a woman’s a woman, it’s no victory hittin’ a woman”, “I been brought up 
never to hit any woman”, “you don’t hit females”, and “it’s just the way society is, you don’t 
hit women”. The ambivalent response was also grounded in a sense of “vulnerability” but this 
was also seen to apply to men: “(a man) could sorta defend their selves sometimes, but the 
woman can’t…I dunno, it’s still the same but it’s not”. In contrast to many of the affirmative 
responses, the negative response was grounded in a sense of “sameness”; “they’re both the 
same…they both have blood running through their system, they both have feelings”.  
 Assault/sexual assault. When asked if there was a difference between assault and 
sexual assault, all but one participant responded in the affirmative. Thirteen of the affirmative 
responses indicated that sexual assault was worse than assault, whereas two simply indicated 
that there was a difference. Affirmative responses were generally grounded in a sense of 
“personal violation” and “emotional damage”. Typical responses included, “a sexual assault 
is an intimate”, “you’ve invaded somebody’s personal space”, “sex is private”, “if you rape a 
girl, they’re fucked for life bra”, and “if you sexually assault someone, it’s their physical and 
their emotion too, inside of them too”. The single negative response was grounded in a sense 
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of “sameness”: “in assault you could be hurt…and sexual assault is about the same ‘cause can 
be bashed and sexually assaulted”.  
Participants’ Stage Scores 
Of the 16 participants, 13 showed evidence of Stage 1 reasoning, 16 showed evidence 
of Stage 2 reasoning, and 13 showed evidence of Stage 3 reasoning. None showed evidence 
of Stage 4 or 5 reasoning. The majority of participants (i.e., 14) had one modal score. That is, 
they demonstrated a distinct trend towards a single stage of moral reasoning.  Five 
participants reasoned predominantly at Stage 1, eight predominantly at Stage 2, and one 
predominantly at Stage 3. Of the two participants with more than one modal score, both 
demonstrated codominant trends on adjacent stages (i.e., Stages 1 and 2 or Stages 2 and 3).  
Distribution of Stage Scores  
Frequency distributions of participants’ stage scores and sexual and nonsexual group 
distributions of stage scores for each of the moral reasoning questions are presented in Table 
1. These show that 75% of all responses are characterised by preconventional reasoning 
(Stage 1 or 2). The remaining 25% of responses are characterised by lower level (Stage 3) 
conventional reasoning. Stage 1, 2, and 3 responses are observed in relatively equal 
distributions for the group as a whole, however Stage 2 reasoning dominated.  
. Responses for both sexual and non-sexual offender groups are characterised by 
preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) reasoning. The remaining responses for both groups are 
characterised by lower level (Stage 3) conventional reasoning. Stage 2 reasoning was the 
dominant response for both groups, followed by Stage 1 reasoning and by Stage 3 reasoning.  
Overall distributions. Responses to all questions were dominated by preconventional 
(Stage 1 and 2) reasoning. This effect was strongest among the “poor/rich” and 
“shop/person” questions, with no Stage 3 responses for the former, and only 1 for the latter. 
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In contrast, preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) and conventional (Stage 3) reasoning were more 
or less codominant for the “assault/sexual assault” question, with only one Stage 1 response.  
Sexual and nonsexual group distributions. No differences were observed between the 
sexual and nonsexual offending groups on the “shop/person”, “old/young”, and “poor/rich” 
questions. Responses to each of these questions were dominated by preconventional (Stage 1 
and 2) reasoning for both groups. However, differences were observed between groups on all 
other questions.  Preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) reasoning was dominant among the sexual 
offender group on the “obey law” question, whereas preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) and 
lower level conventional (Stage 3) reasoning were more or less codominant among the 
nonsexual offender group. On the “man/woman” question, preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) 
reasoning dominated among the nonsexual offender group whereas preconventional (Stage 1 
and 2) and lower level conventional (Stage 3) reasoning were more or less codominant 
among the sexual offender group. In contrast, for the “assault/sexual assault” question, 
preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) reasoning dominated among the sexual offender group 
whereas preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) and lower level conventional (Stage 3) reasoning 
were more or less codominant among the nonsexual offender group.  
Insert Table 1  
Discussion 
Moral Reasoning and Offending Behaviour 
This study replicates previous findings that offenders are arrested in their moral 
development and reason predominantly at the preconventional level. It extends previous 
research in that it examined moral reasoning in offending contexts in which these serious 
young offenders had prior experience. Given the very low levels of moral reasoning 
identified in this group, the development of interventions to enhance the moral reasoning 
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abilities of offenders appears warranted even though  the link between moral reasoning 
ability and moral behaviour has not yet been empirically demonstrated.  
No differences in moral reasoning ability were found between sexual and nonsexual 
offenders in this study. These findings are broadly consistent with those of other studies (see 
Priest, Kordinak, & Wynkoop, 1991; Wilson, Goodwin, & Beck, 2002), although the 
convergent validity of these findings is difficult to ascertain because the sample 
characteristics and measures of moral reasoning varied between studies. For example, Priest 
et al. and Wilson et al. used the DIT to measure the quality of moral reasoning. The DIT is a 
fixed choice response based measure of moral reasoning ability designed to evaluate the use 
of principled moral reasoning. Analyses in those studies were based on the extent to which 
postconventional (Stage 5 and 6) reasoning (P score) was employed. In contrast, this study 
used the MJI, a production-based measure of moral reasoning ability that yields rich 
qualitative responses that cannot be obtained with forced choice questionnaires. Findings 
from this study suggest that measures of postconventional reasoning are unlikely to 
discriminate between different offending groups because offenders do not engage in 
postconventional reasoning. It is therefore possible that the DIT may not adequately assess 
the moral reasoning abilities of offenders (Claypoole et al., 2000) or discriminate between 
offender and offence characteristics. When Wilson et al. considered group differences in 
scores reflecting preconventional (Stage 2) and conventional (Stage 3 and 4) reasoning (by 
summing responses within stories that reflect decision making at each of the levels), 
differences in the quality of moral reasoning employed by armed robbers and rapists 
emerged, with the armed robbers demonstrating a greater use of Stage 3 reasoning than the 
rapists. Such group differences are lost in studies that employ the DIT. Concerns such as 
these raise serious doubts about the validity of findings from studies that employ the DIT 
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within offending populations, and indicate that production based instruments may be more 
valid for these populations.  
Moral Reasoning and Offending Context  
The current study demonstrated that the quality of moral reasoning employed by 
offenders varies as a function of the offending context. While responses to all questions were 
dominated by preconventional (Stage 1 and 2) reasoning, questions related to property 
offending (i.e., the “”shop/person”, “old/young” and “poor/rich” questions) showed the most 
consistent use of the lowest level of moral reasoning. In contrast, there was a stronger 
presence of conventional (Stage 3) reasoning among the person offending contexts (i.e., the 
“man/woman” and “assault/sexual assault” questions), with only one Stage 1 response 
provided to the “assault/sexual assault” question. These findings suggest that offenders are 
less likely to engage in conventional reasoning in property offending contexts, and more 
likely to engage in conventional reasoning in person offending contexts. Krebs, Vermeulen, 
and Denton (1991) have suggested that the quality of moral reasoning employed by 
individuals is determined by an interaction between person-related (level of moral 
competence) and situational (type of moral dilemma) variables. Findings from this study 
support this contention. To date however, little other research has examined the moral 
reasoning abilities of offenders within different offending contexts. For example, although 
Palmer and Hollin (1998) found the quality of offenders’ moral reasoning to be lower in 
offending contexts than in non-offending contexts, they did not examine the quality of moral 
reasoning employed by offenders in different offending contexts. Findings from the Palmer 
and Hollin study the current findings, and provide convergent validity for the notion that 
moral reasoning is influenced by the offending context.  
This study also compared the quality of moral reasoning employed by sexual and 
nonsexual offender groups within each of the offending contexts. The quality of moral 
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reasoning employed by offenders was hypothesised to be impaired in those offending 
contexts in which they had prior experience. This hypothesis predicted that the quality of 
moral reasoning employed by the sexual offender group would be lower in sexual offending 
contexts (i.e., “assault/sexual assault”) and that the quality of moral reasoning employed by 
the nonsexual offender group would be lower in nonsexual offending contexts (i.e., the three 
property offending contexts and the “man/woman” question). While no differences were 
observed between sexual and nonsexual offender groups within any of the property offending 
contexts (i.e., “shop/person”, “old/young”, and “poor/rich” questions) the person offending 
contexts appeared to promote a greater use of conventional reasoning among the sexual 
offender group for the “man/woman” question, and a greater use of conventional reasoning 
among the nonsexual offender group for the “assault/sexual assault” question. Responses 
within the sexual offending context (i.e., “assault/sexual assault”) were dominated by 
preconventional reasoning among the sexual offender group, and responses within the 
nonsexual offending contexts (i.e., property offending contexts and the “man/woman” 
question) were dominated by preconventional reasoning among the nonsexual offender 
group. Moreover, the sexual offending group was found to employ a greater use of 
conventional reasoning in a nonsexual offending context (i.e., “man/woman”) and the 
nonsexual offender group was found to employ a greater use of conventional reasoning in the 
sexual offending context. Whether a cause or a consequence of their offending experiences, 
these findings suggest that offenders are likely to have offence specific moral reasoning 
deficits that are more pronounced than their global reasoning deficits. Interventions aimed at 
reducing offending behaviour by enhancing moral development may therefore need to target 
offence specific moral reasoning deficits in order to be effective. 
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Theoretical Implications 
Kohlberg’s (1958, 1978) theory of moral development states that moral reasoning 
changes over time in predictable stages moving from the simple (low) to the complex (high) 
and that the complex, or higher stages are more adaptive and different from the simple, lower 
stages (Buttell, 2002). According to the theory, moral development determines the quality of 
the underlying logic employed across situations, and allows individuals to comprehend all 
stages below and one stage above their diagnosed stage of reasoning. Kohlberg suggests that 
individuals typically reason at their highest level of ability (i.e., moral competence) because 
moral issues are resolved more effectively at the higher stages. Lower levels of moral 
reasoning are only employed “in situations with a significant downward press” (i.e., under 
suboptimal conditions) (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; p. 8). Findings from this study support this 
theory. Even though stage scores ranged between Stage 1 and Stage 3 for the majority of the 
adolescent offenders in the current study (i.e., 10), the vast majority (i.e., 14) had only one 
modal score, demonstrating a distinct trend towards a single stage of moral reasoning. Of the 
two offenders with more than one modal score, both demonstrated codominant trends on 
adjacent stages. That is, the adolescent offenders in the current study appeared to use a 
coherent structural orientation when reasoning about the questions. These findings support 
the notion that moral development determines the quality of the underlying logic employed 
across situations, and lend support to this aspect of Kohlberg’s theory.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study employed a qualitative research design to explore, for the first time, the 
moral reasoning abilities of very serious adolescent male offenders. A qualitative approach 
produces rich and detailed information but is suitable for smaller sample sizes because of the 
very labor intensive transcription and analysis it requires.  The current findings may not 
generalise to larger populations of (sexual and nonsexual) adolescent offenders, and are 
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limited to the particular characteristics (including gender) of the sample used in this study. 
Further, while the data from this study were coded and quantified according to the 
methodology and procedures outlined in the MJI Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987), the scoring procedure was necessarily modified to allow for the scoring of 
questions that were not represented in the manual. While the approach used in this study has 
been used successfully in previous research (see Trevethan & Walker, 1989), deviation from 
the standardised procedure may compromise the validity of these findings, and make it 
difficult to make direct comparisons with other studies. Finally, small sample size prevented 
the use of statistical procedures to establish “statistically significant” differences between the 
groups and the offending contexts. Findings are based on the relative distributions of stage 
scores.  
Conclusion 
 Findings from the current study demonstrate that offenders are arrested in their moral 
development, and reason at the preconventional level. No differences in moral reasoning 
ability were found between sexual and nonsexual offender groups in this study.  The 
relationship between moral reasoning ability and offender type remains unclear and further 
research in this area is warranted. Findings suggest that the quality of moral reasoning 
employed by offenders varies as a function of the offending context. Moreover, they suggest 
that moral reasoning is impaired in those offending contexts in which offenders have had 
prior experience, and that offenders have offence specific moral reasoning deficits. Despite 
these deficits, offenders appear to employ a coherent structural orientation when engaging in 
moral reasoning and level of moral development appears to determine the quality of the 
underlying logic employed across different offending situations. Research in this area needs 
to shift its focus beyond the “offender/non-offender” dichotomy and address the factors that 
both undermine and enhance the quality of moral reasoning employed by offenders in 
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different offending contexts. Research is yet to establish the link between moral reasoning 
ability, moral behaviour, and offending behaviour, to identify the conditions that allow 
offenders to reason at their lowest and highest potentials, and the circumstances under which 
moral reasoning is most likely to influence offending behaviour. 
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Table 4. Relative distributions (%) of stage scores for the sexual and nonsexual offender groups 
 
   Sexual (n=7)      Nonsexual (n=9)    
 
Level  Pre  Total  Con   Pre  Total  Con        χ2           p   
Stage  1 2   3   1 2   3    
 
Obey law  42.9 28.6 71.4  28.6   44.4 11.1 55.6  44.4     1.64         ns 
 
Shop/Person  42.9 42.9 85.7  14.3   33.3 66.7 100.0  0.0      6.16       .05   
   
Old/Young  28.6 42.9 71.4  28.6   22.2 44.4 66.7  33.3      0.89         ns   
 
Poor/Rich  42.9 57.1 100.0  0.0   44.4 55.6 100.0  0.0      8.43       .025 
 
Man/Woman  14.3 42.9 57.1  42.9   44.4 33.3 77.8  22.2      0.13         ns   
   
Assault/           14.3 57.1 71.4  28.6   0.0 44.4 44.4  55.6       5.42       ns 
Sexual assault 
   
 
Total  31.0 45.2 76.2  23.8             23.8 31.5 42.6 74.1 25.9           5.26        ns 
 
Note. Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding 
 
